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Search and Seizure Under the Fourth Amendment as
Interpreted by the United States Supreme Court*
By E. G. TRiMBLE**
In Lustig v. U. S. 1 the Court had before it again the question
of the admissibility of evidence obtained by a federal official participating without authority in a search by state officials. The
principle of law to be applied was not in dispute but the problem
was the application of the principle to this particular case. The
detailed facts therefore are important. The facts were as follows:
Federal Agent, Greene, got tips from the Cambden, New Jersey
police and from the manager of a hotel there that two men in
Room 402 were suspected of being engaged in violating the counterfeit laws of the United States. Greene went to the hotel, looked
through the key hole of the door to the room, and saw Lustig in
the room with some bags but saw nothing to indicate counterfeiting. He reported back to the police that he was confident
"something was going on" in that room. In order to get in the
room and find out what was going on the police got warrants for
the arrest of the two men registered for that room on a charge
of violating a local ordinance requiring "known criminals" to
register with police within 24 hours after arriving in the city.
They then entered the room in the absence of the occupants
and searched it. They emptied the contents of the bags and
dresser drawers on the bed, which consisted of counterfeiting
equipment, and notified Greene who had waited at police headquarters "to see what they would find." When Greene was notified by the police of what they had found he came to the room
and looked over the material. The occupants of the room returned
and were arrested and searched by the state police officers. Greene
kept some of the material found in the room and examined a
$100 bill taken out of Lustig's pocket, but which was not used as
evidence, in an effort to determine whether it had been used in
* This is the fourth and final installment of this article. Previous installments
appeared in the January, 1953, May 1953, and January 1954 issues of this Journal.
** Professor of Political Science, University of Kentucky, Lexington. A.B.,
Berea College; Ph.D., Yale University; member of Kentucky Bar.
2338
U. S. 74 (1949).
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connection with counterfeiting. Greene and the state officers took
all the evidence to police headquarters and sorted it out, Greene
keeping some of it. Some of what he kept had been given him in
the hotel room. The material kept by him was used as evidence,
over Lustig's protest, to convict him of counterfeiting. The
validity of the lower court's ruling permitting the use of the evidence was the question before the Supreme Court.
Justice Frankfurter wrote the majority opinion reversing the
lower court. He assumed that Greene was "not the moving force
of the search, and that the search was not undertaken by the police
to help enforcement of a federal law." "But," he said, "search is
a functional, not merely a physical process" and is not "completed
until effective appropriation, as part of an uninterrupted transaction, is made of illicitly obtained objects for subsequent proof
of an offense." Greene's critical examination and selection of the
evidence he wanted "was not severable, and therefore was part of
the search carried on in that room." It could make no difference,
he thought, whether the state officials found and turned over to
Greene the evidence for examination or the agent himself took
the articles out of the bags. The evidence showed, he continued,
that Greene was called in before the search was completed, and
"to differentiate between participation from the beginning of an
illegal search and joining it before it had run its course, would be
to draw too fine a line in the application of the prohibition of
the Fourth Amendment as interpreted in Byars v. U. S.... The

crux of that doctrine is that a search is a search by a federal official
if he had a hand in it."2 He concluded by saying that the search
could not be defended as "incidental to a lawful arrest" because
"Greene never made the arrest, and he knew that Lustig and
Reynolds were not present" 3 when he entered the search.
Justice Reed wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice
Vinson and Justices Jackson and Burton concurred. He said that
his understanding of the decision in the Byars case was that the
government could use evidence "improperly seized by state officers operating entirely on their own account." He then pointed
out that "the trial court found that Greene did not participate
in the search and seizure," and thought "we should accept that
2Id. at 78.
'Id. at 79.
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finding."' 4 He said "it was not until after all the articles were
found that were offered in evidence that agent Greene was called
in." In support of that conclusion he quoted from the brief for
Lustig that when Greene "arrived at the hotel, all the material
that had been taken out of the brief case was on the bed." After
examining the material Greene left the room and returned as
Lustig and his companion were returning. The state officers arrested and searched them and took from Reynolds a $100 bill
which Greene examined, but it was not used as "evidence against
Lustig and has nothing to do with the case against him,"
Justice Reed said. "The search and seizure had run its course,"
he concluded, and "we should not hold that the appearance of a
federal officer at the place of unlawful search and seizure after evidence has been found make him a participant in the act." 5
The essential difference between the majority and the minority
opinions is upon the degree of participation by federal officials
without authority in a search by state officials that is necessary to
make the evidence thus secured inadmissible in a federal court.
On such nice questions of degree, turning inevitably on the philosophy of the Justices, do the constitutional right to privacy of
the citizen depend. At any rate, according to this decision, participation by Federal officers without authority at any stage of a
search by state authorities will vitiate the search as far as the
Federal Courts are concerned.
On the same day that the foregoing case was decided, the Court
decided Wolfe v. Colorado.6 This case involved the question
whether the due process clause of the 14th Amendment prohibited
the use of evidence obtained in a prosecution in a state court,
under circumstances that would make it inadmissible in a prosecution in a federal court because of the illegal search and seizure.
The detailed facts of the case were not set forth, but merely the
legal question that arose in the state court. Justice Frankfurter
wrote the opinion of the Court. He began by pointing out that
the Court had repeatedly held that the due process clause did not
make the entire Bill of Rights applicable to the states and said
the Court adhered to the view it took in Palko v. Connecticut 7
IId.
at 81.
5
Id.
338 at
U.83.
S. 25 (1949).
"302 U. S. 319 (1937).
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that the term "due process of law" guaranteed to the citizen as
against his state all that is "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty." The phrase "due process of law" he said "is the compendious expression for all those rights which the courts must
enforce because they are basic to our free society."" These rights
though were not static and the Court had wisely adopted the
policy of working out the meaning of "due process of law" by a
process of "inclusion and exclusion" rather than by attempting to
fix its meaning once and for all. He continued:
...the

security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion

by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is, therefore, implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty and as such enforceable
against the states through the due process clause. The
knock at the door, whether by day or night, as a prelude to
a search, without authority of law but solely on the
authority of the police, did not need the commentary of
recent history to be condemned as inconsistent with the
conception of human rights enshrined in the history and the
basic constitutional documents of English-speaking peoples.
Accordingly we have no hesitation in saying that were a
state affirmatively to sanction such incursion into privacy it
would run counter to the guaranty of the Fourth Amendment. 9
But the ways of enforcing such a basic right, he said, raised questions of a different order. He then pointed out that in the Weeks
case in 1914 the Court ruled for the first time that evidence
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment was inadmissible
in a federal court. This ruling was not based on any Congressional law or derived from "the explicit requirements" of the
Amendment but "was a matter of judicial implication." To this
ruling the Court stoutly adhered, he said. He then examined to
what extent the ruling in the Weeks case was followed in the
states and in Great Britain. He found that the states of this
country were divided, some 30 rejecting the ruling and some 17
following it; while of ten jurisdictions within the British Commonwealth of nations that had passed on it none had followed it.
After pointing out that in those jurisdictions which rejected the
Weeks doctrine other remedies for an illegal search and seizure
8338 U. S. 25, 27 (1949).
Id. at 28.

9
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were available, such as a suit in trespass against an offending officer, or criminal prosecution, he said, "Indeed the exclusion of
evidence . . . directly serves only to protect those upon whose

person or premises something incriminating has been found." He
concluded, "we cannot, therefore, regard it as a departure from
basic standards to remand such persons, together with those who
emerge scatheless from a search, to the remedies of private action
and such protection as the internal discipline of the police, under
the eyes of an alert public opinion, may afford ....

It is not for

this Court to condemn as falling below the minimal standards
assured by the due process clause a state's reliance upon other
methods which, if consistently enforced, would be equally effective."' 0 He followed this by saying that there was more reason
for applying the Weeks rule in a federal case because local opinion
could better prevent oppressive police action than public opinion
could with federal authority. He concluded by saying "We hold,
therefore, that in a prosecution in a state court for a state crime
the 14th Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence
obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure." He then implied that Congress could possibly negate the Weeks rule, saying
that if Congress attempted to do so "we would then be faced with
the problem of the respect to be accorded the legislative judgment
on an issue as to which, in default of that judgment, we have
been forced to depend on our own.""1
Justice Black wrote a brief concurring opinion in which he
said he agreed "with what appears to be a plain implication of
the Court's opinion that the federal exclusionary rule is not a
command of the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created
rule of evidence which Congress might negate."'12 Justice Murphy
wrote a dissent concurred in by Justice Rutledge. He said that
there were three devices for enforcing the Fourth Amendment,
that is, judicial exclusion of the evidence obtained in violation
of it, criminal prosecution of violators, and civil action in trespass
against violators. As to criminal prosecution of violators of the
Amendment he thought it was unrealistic to "expect the District
Attorney to prosecute himself or his associates for well-meaning
violations of the search and seizure clause during a raid the Dis'Old. at 31.
nId. at 33.
"Id. at 40.
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trict Attorney or his associates have ordered."' 3 He made out a
convincing case that a civil action in trespass in those states that
did not follow the Weeks rule is no remedy at all. Some of these
states limited damages to actual damage to physical property; where
punitive damages were permitted, (and in some they are not permitted) the plaintiff had to show ill will or malice on the part of
the officer. He then showed how in those states that follow the
Weeks rule it had been made effective in the recruit training programs and in-service courses provided for enforcement officers.
"The contrast between states with the federal rule and those without it," he said, "is thus a positive demonstration of its efficiency."' 14
He concluded by saying "I cannot believe that we should decide
due process questions by simply taking a poll of the rules in
various jurisdictions, even if we follow the Palko "test" ...

even

more important, perhaps, it must have tragic effect upon public
respect for our judiciary. For the Court now allows what is in-

deed shabby business; lawlessness by officers of the law."'5 , Justices
Rutledge and Douglas each wrote brief separate dissenting opinions in which they agreed with Justice Murphy that the Fourth
Amendment without the Weeks rule had no effective sanction.
Justice Rutledge challenged Justice Frankfurter's implication that
Congress could pass "legislation permitting the introduction in
federal courts of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment." He thought that had been settled in the Boyd case in
which the Court declared unconstitutional legislation which the
Court considered had that effect. 16
The various opinions have been summarized because it was
felt that the importance of the decision justified getting all the
opinions before the reader. It is believed too that the majority
opinion is open to objections other than those presented by the
dissenting members of the Court. The majority opinion said the
principle of the Fourth Amendment "is basic to a free society,"
is implicit in the "concept of ordered liberty" and hence "enforceable against the states through the due process clause," that "were
a state affirmatively to sanction such incursion into privacy it
would run counter to the guaranty of the Fourth Amendment,"
'

Id. at 42.

41d.

at 46.

Id. at 46.
'aOld. at 48.
'
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but it followed these statements by saying "the 14th Amendment
does not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure. ' '17 These statements seem on their
face to be directly contradictory. This seems to mean that although freedom from unreasonable searches and seizure is basic
to a free society and is enforceable against the state through the
14th Amendment the Court will not act unless the state takes some
affirmative action, presumably by legislative enactment. If this is
what is meant it would still be necessary for the due process clause
to be applied by the courts, chiefly the Supreme Court. And why
should it be more willing to apply the due process clause when
state legislation is involved than when the action of state courts,
without affirmative legislation, is involved? How could a state
more affirmatively sanction such incursion into the privacy of the
individual than through its courts? When the courts of a state
without such legislation admit evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure they are presumably following the common law rule of refusing to look into the method by which relevant evidence has been obtained. If the admission of such evidence in a federal court is a violation of the Fourth Amendment
as the Court had held in the Weeks case, and, as it said in the
instant case, it would hold a violation of the due process clause
of the 14th Amendment if affirmatively sanctioned by the state,
why should it not so hold when the state courts admitted such
evidence? State courts being agents of the state can certainly
violate the due process clause as well as can a state legislature.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that judicial and administrative agencies of the states can violate the 14th Amendment.
As early as 1894 the Court said the prohibitions of the Amendment "extend to all acts of the state, whether through its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities,"' 8 and there have
been numerous cases since that time in which the Court has held
that state judicial procedure has violated the due process clause.
For instance, in one case' 9 the Court held that when a state court
admitted as evidence confessions which had been obtained by physical torture, and conviction resulted, there was a denial of due
17Id.

at 33.
Scott v.v.McNeal,
154 U.
"Brown
Mississippi,
297S.U.84S.(1854).
278 (1936). Other cases are there cited.
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process. Apparently the Court's refusal to apply the Weeks rule
in this case was due to a lack of conviction that the Fourth Amendment made the Weeks rule mandatory and to a doubt as to the
rule's soundness. There is no reason to believe that the Court in
the Weeks case considered it "a judicially created rule of evidence"
as Justice Black considered it. On the contrary the Court in that
case said the "letters in question were taken from the house of the
accused ... in direct violation of the constitutionalrights of the
defendant." Justice Frankfurter said that whether "the right to
protection against arbitrary intrusion by the police demands the
exclusion of logically relevant evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure because, in a federal prosecution for a
federal crime it would be excluded, as a matter of inherent reason
...is an issue as to which men with complete devotion to the
20
protection of the right of privacy might give different answers."
This is quite correct; but it is not so clear that if the Court is
willing to pronounce a state law unconstitutional which authorized the use of such evidence it should not be willing to rule it
unconstitutional when a state's courts admit such evidence as a
matter of policy. It may be true also that it is wise policy for the
Court to work out the meaning of "due process" by a process of inclusion and exclusion as cases arise, as he said, but it seems that
this should be done on the basis of some guiding basic principles.
Granted that the Weeks rule had not been followed in some
states. That fact does not establish its unsoundness if the Court
considered the protection of the individual's privacy as "basic to a
free society."
The statement as to what the Court might do if Congress attempted to repeal the Weeks' rule seems to overlook the Boyd
case, for in that case, decided prior to the Weeks case, Congress
had acted in a way which the Court felt violated the Fourth
Amendment and the Court declared the law unconstitutional.
Nor would Justice Frankfurter seem to be on sound ground in
his statement that there were more imperative reasons for applying
the Weeks rule as to federal invasion of the privacy of the individual because local public opinion would restrain local police.
The contrary would seem to be the case. Local officials, it is submitted, are much more prone to disregard the principles of the
-388 U. S. 25, 28 (1949).

SEARCH AND SMZURE

Fourth Amendment, provisions of state constitutions to the contrary notwithstanding, than are federal officials.
The writer can close this analysis of the opinion in no better
way than to use Justice Murphy's language at the opening of his
dissent: "It is disheartening to find so much that is right in an
opinion which seems . . . so fundamentally wrong."2' 1 It is
especially disheartening to find the majority opinion from the pen
of such an able and devoted friend of private rights as Justice
Frankfurter has shown himself to be by his previous decisions.
In Brinegar v. United States22 the Court had before it a question very similar to the one in the Carroll case. Brinegar was
convicted for violating a federal law prohibiting the transportation of liquor from a state where the sale of liquor was legal into
a state where its sale was forbidden. The facts were as follows:
Two federal agents, Malsed and Creehan, were parked in their car
in Oklahoma about six miles from the Missouri-Oklahoma border
beside the highway leading from Joplin, Missouri, to Vinita, Oklahoma. The sale of liquor was legal in Missouri but was illegal in
Oklahoma. Brinegar drove past the officers, headed west toward
Vinita in his Ford coupe. Malsed had arrested him five months
previously for the offense of transporting liquor illegally and an
indictment was pending. He had also seen him on two occasions
loading liquor in a car or truck in Joplin, Missouri and knew
him to have a reputation for hauling liquor. Malsed recognized
Brinegar and his car which seemed to be heavily loaded. The officers chased Brinegar at high speed for about a mile and as his
car skided on a curve they sounded their siren, overtook him,
and crowded his car off the road. The officers approached him
and asked him how much liquor he had and he replied "not too
much." After further questioning he admitted he had 12 cases
in his car. They found one case in the front seat and twelve
more hidden in the car. They seized the liquor and arrested
him. This evidence was used to convict him although he challenged its use because the officers had no warrant of any kind.
The officers justified their action on the ground that there was
"probable cause" to search the car. The lower court held that
prior to Brinegar's admission that he had 12 cases of liquor there
21338 U. S. 25, 41 (1949).
3888 U. S. 160 (1949).
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was not probable cause but that his admission justified the search.
The Circuit Court sustained that view. In neither of these courts
was the Carrollcase discussed, although in that case, it will be recalled, the Supreme Court had upheld the search of an automobile
on "probable cause," but under a Congressional statute permitting
such search. This had been defined as "facts and circumstances
which warrant a man of reasonable caution in believing that a
crime is being committed.

23

The Supreme Court speaking through Justice Rutledge upheld the conviction. The opinion compared the facts in detail
with those in the Carrollcase and found that they were so similar
in basic respects that the ruling in the Carrollcase was controlling
here. Justice Rutledge thought the decisions of the lower courts
were erroneous in saying that there was no probable cause until
Brinegar admitted he had 12 cases of liquor because the facts
known to the officers prior to the admission were sufficient to
establish probable cause. 24 The most important of these facts
were: Malsed's knowledge that Brinegar had bought liquor in
Joplin previously; that he had arrested him for the offense of
hauling liquor illegally and an indictment was pending; that he
recognized Brinegar, and also the car as one that he had seen
Brinegar loading with liquor in Joplin in larger quantities than
would be normal for personal consumption; and that Brinegar
when observed was moving in the direction of Vinita, from Joplin
which was geographically the logical source of supply of liquor
for dry Oklahoma.
He then discussed the contention that at the trial hearsay evidence was used which was relied upon by the officers in making
the search, but he insisted there was enough other evidence to
sustain the officer's "conclusion concerning the illegal character
of Brinegar's operations." 25 At the hearing on the preliminary
motion to suppress the evidence obtained by the search, but not at
the trial as to guilt, the judge admitted evidence that Malsed had
arrested Brinegar for the same offense about five months previously. This it was argued was error and deprived the evidence
as a whole of sufficiency to show probable cause. This contention
SCarroll v. U. S., 267 U. S. 132, 162 (1924).

338 U. S. 160, 171 (1949).
SId. at 172.
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Justice Rutledge said, "places a wholly unwarranted emphasis
upon the criterion of admissibility in evidence to prove the accused's guilt, of the facts relied upon to show probable cause."
He said, "there is a large difference between the two things to be
proved, as well as between the tribunals which determine them,
and therefore a like difference in the quanta and modes of proof
required to establish them." Guilt must be established, he said,
"beyond a reasonable doubt"; while in establishing probable
cause "we deal with probabilities," and "the standard of proof is
accordingly correlative to what must be proved."2 6 In trials to
establish guilt therefore evidence of high probative value was often
excluded because it might be misused or misunderstood by the
jury. He felt, therefore, that the court was "neither inconsistent
or improper" in admitting the evidence of previous arrest at the
preliminary hearing and excluding it in the trial.
Justice Burton wrote a brief concurring opinion, and Justice
Jackson for himself and Justices Frankfurter and Murphy wrote
a dissent.
Justice Jackson after a statesmanlike prologue on the importance of protecting the privacy of the individual pointed out that
there were two respects in which the Court's opinion extended the
doctrine of the Carroll case. First, in the Carroll case a Congressional statute authorized the search of automobiles without a warrant, whereas in this case there was no such legislative authority;
second, in the Carroll case the lower court had found probable
cause and the Supreme Court sustained it, whereas in this case
both lower courts had found no probable cause prio'r to the time
Brinegar's car was forced off the road ( which he thought was an
illegal act) and the Court overruled the lower courts. He thought
the cases differed also in that in the Carroll case the evidence on
which probable cause was founded was not hearsay since the officers had previously actually bargained to buy whiskey from Carroll. The Court in that case had also taken judicial notice of the
fact that Detroit was a center for illegally introducing liquor into
the United States. In the present case he said, proof of guilt rested
upon "inferences from two circumstances, neither one of which.
would be allowed to be proved at a trial. One, it appears that the
same officers previously had arrested Brinegar on the same charge
-Id. at 175.
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but there had been no conviction and it does not appear whether
the circumstances ... indicated any strong probability of it. In
any event this evidence . . . would not be admissible ....
As a

second basis for inference the officers also say that Brinegar had
the reputation of being a liquor runner. "27 (This latter would
not be admissible unless an accused opened the subject up, he
said.) He was "surprised that the Court is ready to rule that inadmissible evidence alone, as to vital facts without which other
facts give little indication of guilt, establish probable cause as a
matter of law. ' 28 The only other fact available he pointed out
was that Malsed stated that on two other occasions he had seen
Brinegar loading liquor in a truck in a Missouri town where liquor
was legal. He thought the lower courts were correct in their ruling
that there was no probable cause prior to the time when the officers ran Brinegar's car off the road. In doing that he said, "they
were either taking the initial steps in arrest, search and seizure, or
they were committing a completely lawless and unjustifiable act."
When a car is forced off the road, he continued, as in this case "we
think the officers are then in the position of one who has entered
a home: the search at its commencement must be valid and cannot be saved by what it turns up,129 citing Johnson v. U. S. and
McDonald v. U. S. 30

Basic to the difference between the majority and the minority
-the only difference aside from the evaluation of the facts-is the
difference in regard to how probable cause should be established.
Justice Rutledge would presumably admit any evidence of substantial probative value and apply the standard of a "reasonably
prudent man;" Justice Jackson, while willing to admit evidence
of probative value, would be unwilling to permit probable cause
to be established entirely by evidence which would be inadmissible in a trial of guilt. This difference raises the question of
whether or not the rules of evidence that are deemed to be sound
in the trial of criminal cases should not also be considered sound
in determining probable cause which is itself a legal conclusion.
It will be recalled that in Grau v. United States3l the Court in
71 d. at 186.

21Id. at 187.
Id. at 188.

See third installment of this article. 42 Ky. L. J. 197, 226, 230 (1954).
SSee second installment of this article. 41 Ky. L. J. 388, 411 (1953).
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considering a search under a warrant that was challenged as having been issued without probable cause, said "a search warrant
may issue only upon evidence which would be competent in the
trial of the offense before a jury." It would seem that a search
without a warrant should not be permitted on less reliable evidence. This statement was, however, as Justice Rutledge pointed
out in a footnote, 32 dictum and although followed in lower federal
courts the question of its application does not seem to have arisen
in the Supreme Court until the instant case. It would now appear that it has no standing as an expression of the Court's opinion
for here a search without a warrant is permitted by the Court on
its own, that is, without Congressional authority as it had in the
Carrollcase, and on evidence inadmissible in a trial of guilt.
The case of United States v. Rabinowitz33 presented a question
almost identical with that in the Harrisand Trupiano cases, in
which the Court, it will be recalled, reached contrary results. Federal agents had a warrant for the arrest of Rabinowitz for selling
four forged government stamps to a federal postal employee. He
was a previous offender and the agents had reason to believe he
had other counterfeit stamps in his small one-room office. They
went to his office in daytime and arrested him and, without a
search warrant, searched his desk, filing cabinet, and safe, and
found 573 forged stamps. He was convicted of selling stamps and
of having and concealing the others in his possession with intent
to defraud. He made timely motion to suppress the evidence pertaining to the 573 stamps as having been obtained illegally. He
was overruled in the District Court. This was reversed by the Circuit Court on the authority of the Trupiano case, since the officers
had time to get a search warrant and had not done so.
Justice Minton wrote the rather brief majority opinion reversing the Circuit Court. He began by pointing out that the
arrest was lawful, and that the Court had "often recognized that
there was a permissible area of search beyond the person proper,"
citing the familiar dictum from the Agnello case. He then said
that the right incident to lawful arrest to search "the premises
where the arrest was made, which premises were under the control of the person arrested and where the crime was being com338 U. S. 160, 174 note 13.
'339 U. S. 56 (1950).
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mitted"3 4 had become accepted, citing statements in the Carroll,
Boyd and Marron cases. The Marron case he said had not been
"drained of contemporary vitality" by the Go-Bart and Lefkowitz
cases. The latter cases, he said, condemned "general exploratory
searches" while ". . . in the instant case the search was not general
or exploratory for whatever might be turned up. Specificity was
the mark of the search and seizure here." He then made the interesting comment that: "There was probable cause to believe that
respondent was conducting his business illegally." 35 He cited the
Harris case as "ample authority for the more limited search here
considered." He then summarized the various reasons why the
District Court was correct in holding the search and seizure
reasonable. These were: the search and seizure were incident to a
lawful arrest, the place of the search was a business room to which
the public including the officers were invited, the room was small
and under the complete control of respondent, the search did not
extend beyond the room used for unlawful purposes, and the possession of the forged stamps was a crime like the possession of
burglar's tools. 36
But, assuming the officers had time to secure a search warrant,
he asked, were they bound to do so? He thought not because the
search was otherwise "reasonable." "A rule of thumb requiring
that a search warrant always be procured whenever practicable
may be appealing from the vantage point of easy administration,"
he continued, "but we cannot agree that this requirement should
be crystallized into a sine qua non to the reasonableness of a
search." The Fourth Amendment he concluded protected the
people against "unreasonable searches" only, and it was not disputed that "there may be reasonable searches incident to an arrest." Having accepted that principle "it becomes apparent that
such searches turn upon the reasonableness under all the circumstances and not upon the practicability of procuring a search
warrant."3 7 To the extent that the Trupiano case was contrary it
was overruled, he said. He continued, "the relevant test is not
whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant but whether
the search was reasonable. That criterion in turn depends upon
35 Id. at 61.
8 Id.at 63.
81Id. at 64.

nId.at 65.
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the facts and circumstances-the total atmosphere of the case."
He closed with this assurance to the skeptical, "it is a sufficient
precaution that law officers must justify their conduct before
courts which have always been, and must be, jealous of the individual's right of privacy within the broad sweep of the Fourth
38
Amendment."
Justice Frankfurter again wrote a scholarly dissenting opinion,
concurred in by Justice Jackson, repeating many of the things he
had said in his dissents in Davis v. United States and Harris v.
United States.39 He began by pointing out that in passing on these
questions "it makes all the difference in the world whether one
approaches the Fourth Amendment as the Court approached it
in Boyd v. United States... or approaches it as a provision dealing
with a formality." The words of the Amendment he said "are not
to be read as they might be read by a man who knows English but
has no knowledge of the history that gave rise to the words." The
Amendment "was the answer of the Revolutionary statesmen to
the evils of searches without warrants and searches with warrants
unrestricted in scope. Both were deemed unreasonable. Words
must be read with the gloss of the experience of those who framed
them."4 0 It outlawed "unreasonable searches" and "then went on
to define the very limited authority that even a warrant issued by
a magistrate could give." Every search was regarded as unreasonable "unless a warrant authorizes it, barring only exceptions justified by absolute necessity." He insisted that the right to search
and to arrest were distinct and separate and quoted Judge Learned
Hand that to make the validity of a search " 'depend upon the
presence of the party in the premises searched at the time of the
arrest... would make crucial a circumstance that has no rational
relevance to the purpose of the privilege ....

The history of the

two privileges is altogether different; the Fourth Amendment distinguished between them; and in statutes they have always been
treated as depending upon separate conditions.' ",41 Justice Frankfurther then considered the necessities that permitted a search incident to an arrest. These were: first, to protect the officer making
the arrest and to deprive the prisoner of the potential means of
"Id. at 66.

'See, third installment of this article. 42 Ky.L. J. 197, 210-224 (1954).
10Id. at 70.
'"Id.at 71.
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escape, citing Clossen v. Morrison;42 second, to prevent the destruction of evidence by the arrested person, citing Reifsnyder v. Lee,
Holker v. Heimessy;43 and third, to permit the search of moving
vehicles, permitted in the Carrollcase, where obtaining a warrant
was impracticable. In the Carrollcase though, he pointed out, the
Court said, "In cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably
practicable, it must be used.... In cases where seizure is impossible except without a warrant, the seizing officer acts unlawfully
and at his peril unless he can show the court probable cause." 44
The first two of these principles, he said, permitted "the search
of the person and those immediate physical surroundings which
may fairly be deemed to be an extension of his person." This
would permit the seizure- of items properly subject to seizure
which were in open view when the arrest was made but would not
authorize a search for such items. He emphasized that the rights
to search and to seize were very different, and an officer might have
one right without the other.
He examined the contention of the Court's opinion that its
major premise-that a lawful arrest gives the right to search the
place of arrest-was supported by past decisions. He began with
the Weeks case and showed that the passage in the opinion referred to did "not even refer to the right to search the place of
arrest" but referred to the right "to search the person of the accused when arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences
of crime" and the right to seize burglar's tools or other proofs of
guilt found upon his arrest within the control of the accused."
He then showed that in the Carroll case where the Court referred
to the right on a lawful arrest of a person to seize "whatever is
found upon his person or in his control which it is unlawful for
him to have and which may be seized" 45 did not give the right to
search the "place" where the arrest took place. These two statements from the Weeks and Carrollcases, he said "were uncritically
expanded" into the dictum in the Agnello case. The decision in
the Marron case was an application and an unsound extension of
the Agnello dictum; but he insisted again, as in his dissent in the
Harriscase, that the Marron decision was drastically qualified in
-47 N. H. 482 (1867).
" 44 Mo. 101 (1876); 141 Mo.527 (1897).
3889
U. S.56, 73 (1950).
IId. at 76.
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the Go-Bart and Lefkowitz cases. His conclusion on this phase of
the question was that: ".. . the right to search the place of arrest is

an innovation based on confusion, without historic foundation, and
made in the teeth of a historic protection against it."46 He recog-

nized that there was a problem of drawing a line around the right
to search incident to arrest, that is, of distinguishing between a
reasonable and unreasonable search, and that this was a question
of degree. He pointed out how unsatisfactory it was to permit
the search of part of a house, say one room and not more. In the
place of Justice Minton's criterion of all the facts and circumstances-"the total atmosphere of the case" he suggested "the very
restricted area that may fairly be deemed part of the person." Any
other view would be taking the term "unreasonable" out of its
context in the Amendment and making the arrest an incident to
an unwarranted search instead of a warrantless search an incident
to an arrest. The purpose of the Fourth Amendment he concluded "was to assure that the existence of probable cause as to
the legal basis for making a search was to be determined by a
judicial officer before arrest not after, subject only to what is
necessarily to be excepted from such requirement." 47 Since there
was no suggestion that the officers did not have time to get a search
warrant he felt that the decision of the majority overruling the
Trupiano case overruled also the underlying principle of the Di
Re, Johnson,and McDonald cases. This gave ground, he thought,
for "the belief that law is the expression of chance-for instance,
of unexpected changes in the Court's composition and the con47
tingencies in the choice of successors."
Justice Black wrote a brief separate dissent in which he agreed
with Justice Frankfurter that the Court's decision cast doubt on
a number of recent decisions, and although he repeated that he
regarded the Weeks rule of excluding evidence obtained by an
illegal search applied in the Trupiano case as a court-made rule of
evidence, he thought "it would be wiser judicial policy to adhere
to the Trupiano rule of evidence, at least long enough to see how
it works.

' 48

Here again the difference between the majority and minority
opinions is a difference in point of view and in approach to the
"Id. at 80.
"Id. at 86.
'Bid. at 67.
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Fourth Amendment. As Justice Frankfurter pointed out what
one gets out of the Fourth Amendment depends on what one puts
into it, and to interpret it without regard to what it meant to the
men who framed it, and to the generation for which they spoke
is, to say the least, a questionable approach to a provision of the
Constitution designed to limit governmental power in the interest
of a basic principle. Aside from the confusion which Justice
Frankfurter found in the majority opinion its soundness is questionable in other respects. Justice Minton here used "probable
cause" as a guide to determine the right to search without a
search warrant when a lawful arrest is made, or allowed the arresting officers to do so. This would not seem to be very different
from allowing them to search without any kind of a warrant whenever they thought it was reasonable, and is, to say the least, a novel
use of "probable cause." The term was used in the Fourth
Amendment as a requirement for a magistrate to issue a warrant
to search. Justice Minton's summary of the reason why the District Court was justified in holding the search legal seems also to
represent some confusion. The first and most valid, yet questionable reason, was that it was incident to a lawful arrest. The second
reason was that the place searched was a "business room to which
the public including the officers was invited." What significance
did this have? The same was true in a number of cases in which
the Court had ruled against the search. Small offices were involved in the Gouled, Go-Bart and Lefkowitz cases. His third
reason was that the room was small and under the complete control of the respondent. The same was true in the cases just
mentioned. And in the light of the holding in the Harris case it
did not matter that the room was small for that case held the officers could search an entire apartment; the fourth reason was
that the search did not extend beyond the room used for unlawful purposes. Again, the Harris case would seem to make that
consideration unimportant. The last argument was that the possession of the forged stamps was a crime, just as the possession of
burglar's tools, lottery tickets, and counterfeit money. This fact
would authorize the seizure of the stamps but it is difficult to see
how it would justify an illegal search for them. If the search was
4
illegal at the beginning what was found could not legalize it. 9
" Byars v. U. S., 273 U. S. 28 (1927).
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In fact the entire basis of the Court's opinion is questionable,
for the basis is that all that is necessary to make a search legal is
that it be reasonable under all the facts and circumstances-"the
total atmosphere of the case." That would seem to partially "repeal" the Fourth Amendment. For why put in written form a
constitutional provision requiring a search warrant if all that is
necessary to make a search legal is that it be reasonable. Any
number of factual situations might make it seem perfectly reasonable to search a suspect's house or office, but the Fourth Amendment requires that a judicial officer, not a policeman, pass on the
matter of reasonableness before a search is made. In fact one of
the chief purposes of a written constitution is to avoid leaving the
wisdom of governmental action entirely to the reasonableness of
those entrusted with power, thus to insure that this be a government of laws and not of men. He emphasized that the Fourth
Amendment prohibited only "unreasonable" searches but, as the
Court had emphasized in the Boyd case, the framers of the Amendment no doubt had in mind as unreasonable searches those under
writs of assistance or general writs that were so general in form
as to permit almost unlimited search. Hence they prohibited
"unreasonable searches and seizure" and then specified that "no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or things to be seized." This was the view taken,
it will be recalled, by the Massachusetts court in Commonwealth
v. Dana,"° and as is shown below, is supported by other evidence.
To make the legality of a search depend upon "the total atmosphere of the case" is little guide at all and opens the way for the
decision to be made by police officers in the first instance and
perhaps the courts afterwards on the basis of every conceivable
human emotion. It is difficult to believe that the men who framed
the Amendment had any such thought in mind.
Another recent decision of the Court on the subject is On Lee
v. United States.51 In this case the petitioner was convicted on two
counts of selling a pound of opium in violation of federal law and
of conspiring to sell opium. Petitioner ran a laundry and one
Chin Poy, an acquaintance and former employee, visited the launCommonwealth v. Dana, 2 Met. (Mass.) 328 (1841).
843 U. S. 747 (1952).
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dry one day and engaged him in conversation in which petitioner
made some incriminating statements. He did not know that Poy
was at that time an undercover man for the Bureau of Narcotics.
Poy was wired for sound, with a small microphone in his pocket
and a small antenna running along his arm. Another agent, Lee,
was on the sidewalk outside with a receiving set with which he
could pick up the conversation inside the laundry. At the trial,
agent Lee who had remained outside testified to the conversation
in which petitioner had made the incriminating statements. Petitioner objected to the use of this evidence as having been obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment, in violation of the Federal
Communications Act prohibiting wire tapping,and argued also
that it violated judicial fair play under federal law.
Justice Jackson wrote the majority opinion upholding conviction. The opinion began by saying that the Fourth Amendment had not been violated. Poy "entered a place of business with
the consent, if not by the implied invitation, of the petitioner."
He was not a trespasser, therefore, as had been argued before the
Court. It was argued further that Poy's conduct after leaving the
laundry vitiated the consent supposedly given by On Lee and made
his entry a trespass ab initio. This could not be maintained,
Justice Jackson said, because the Court had ruled in McGuire v.
United States that trespass ab initio was a rule for liability in civil
actions only. He also rejected petitioners argument that the entry
was a trespass because obtained by fraud. "The rationale of the
McGuire case rejects such fine-spun doctrine for exclusion of evidence,"5 2 he said. He stated further that petitioner could not rely
on cases involving search and seizure of tangible property such as
papers, for "such decisions are inapposite in the field of mechanical
or electronic devices designed to overhear or intercept conversations, at least where access to the listening post was not obtained
by illegal methods."5 3 Petitioner requested that the Court reconsider the question of rights under the Fourth Amendment in regard to overheard or intercepted conversations. Justice Jackson
said this would not help petitioner for his case was not analogous
to wire tapping. The use of the transmitter and receiver to overhear petitioner's indiscreet conversation with Poy had "the same
effect on his privacy as if agent Lee had been eavesdropping outId. at 752. McGuire v. U. S., 273 U. S. 95 (1927).

"343 U. S.747, 753 (1952).
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side an open window54 which would not be illegal. The argument
that the Communications Act had been violated was dismissed by
saying that petitioner "was not sending messages to anybody or
using a system of communication within the Act."
He then took up the argument that the Court should exclude
the evidence as a method of disciplining federal officers, and explained that "in order that constitutional or statutory right may
not be undetermined, this Court has on occasion evolved or
adopted from the practice of other courts exclusionary rules of
evidence going beyond the requirements of the constitutional or
statutory provision." This was though a departure from the common law rule of not rejecting relevant evidence because it had
been obtained illegally. Such departure had to be justified "by
some strong social policy," he said. There had been no violation
of the constitution here, and "exclusion of the evidence would
have to be based on a policy which placed the penalizing of Chin
Poy's breach of confidence above ordinary canons of relevancy,"
he continued. He recognized the questionable reputation of Poy
but insisted that "no good reason of public policy occurs to us
why the Government should be deprived of the benefit of On
Lee's admissions because he made them to a confidante of shady
character." 5 The trend in recent years, he said, had been toward
leaving more matters to a jury's discretion and "the use of informers, accessories, accomplices, false friends, or any of the other
betrayals which are dirty business may raise serious questions of
credibility," but such matters could be handled by wide latitude
in cross-examination of witnesses and by juries. He did not feel
that the Government should "be arbitrarily penalized for the low
morals of its informers." Disapproval of the conduct of Chin Poy
"must not be thought to justify a social policy of the magnitude
necessary to arbitrarily exclude otherwise relevant evidence"86 he
concluded.
Justice Black dissented in one paragraph saying that the Court
in exercising its supervisory authority over criminal justice in the
federal courts should hold that the District Court should have
57
rejected the evidence.
' Id. at 754.
T Id. at 756.

Id. at 757.
'"Id.at 758.
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Justice Douglas wrote a brief dissent in which he recanted
his having joined earlier in the opinion in the Goldman case which
refused to overrule the Olmstead decision upholding wiretapping.
He had since come to the conclusion that the dissents in the Olinstead case were sound and that "the nature of the instrument that
science or engineering develops is not important." "The controlling, the decisive factor is the invasion of privacy against the
commands of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments," he thought.
He concluded, "it is important to civil liberties that we pay more
than lip service to the view that this manner of obtaining evidence
against people is dirty business." 58
Justice Frankfurter dissented for much the same reasons given
by Justice Douglas. He said that "... of course, criminal prosecution is more than a game. But ... it should not be a dirty game
in which the 'dirty business' of criminals is outwitted by the 'dirty
business' of law officers. The contrast between the morality professed by society and immorality practiced on its behalf makes for
contempt of law." 59 He felt also that the Olmstead case should be
overruled and quoted approvingly Justice Holmes' statement in
that case that it was "a less evil that some criminals should escape
than that the Government should play an ignoble part."
Justice Burton dissented in an opinion in which Justice Frankfurter joined. He maintained that the Fourth Amendment protected intangible as well as tangible things and that where and
how evidence is obtained is the important thing. He thought
that when Poy "without warrant and without petitioner's consent,
took with him the concealed radio transmitter to which agent Lee's
receiving set was tuned ... that amounted to Poy surreptitiously
bringing Lee with him," and that was equivalent to a federal'
officer without warrant or permission entering a house and overhearing conversations and reporting it. This he thought would be
a violation of the Amendment. In this case he said "the words
were picked up without warrant or consent within the constitutionally inviolate 'house' of a person entitled to protection there
against unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, house,
papers and effects." 60
The division of the Court in this case was based largely upon
Id. at 765.
Id. at 759.
'OId. at 766.
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a difference of opinion as to social policy. The majority was not
convinced that considerations of policy justified it in departing
from the common law rule of not inquiring into the method by
which relevant evidence was obtained; it also applied the principle
of interpretation used in the Olmsted case and held that the deceptive reporting of the accused's conversation was not a violation
of the Fourth Amendment, there being no physical search.
Among the dissenters Justices Douglas, Frankfurter, and presumably Justice Black, felt that as a matter of public policy the
evidence should be excluded because of the "dirty" methods used
in obtaining it. They both believed also that the Olmstead case
should be overruled. Justice Burton considered the fraudulent
methods used in getting the evidence to be a violation of the
Amendment.
The latest consideration of the Amendment by the Court is in
the case of Irvine v. California.61 The case called for a reconsideration of the rule of Wolf v. Colorado.6 2 The basic facts were as follows: Irvine was convicted of violating the laws of California
against gambling by having engaged in horse-race bookmaking.
When arrested he had on his person a federal wagering tax stamp.
This and other evidence from the office of the U. S. Collector of
Revenue was admitted as evidence. In addition, the police in
order to get evidence against Irvine had a key made to his house
and during the absence of him and his family entered the house
and installed a microphone in the hall, later moved it to the bedroom, and finally into a closet. It remained in the house for several weeks. A hole was bored in the roof and a wire run to a
neighboring garage where the agents listened in on petitioner's
conversations which were incriminating. He appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court on the ground, among others, that
the latter evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment as made applicable to the states by the due process clause
of the 14th Amendment. Justice Jackson wrote the Court's
opinion for himself, the Chief Justice, and Justices Reed and
Minton. Justice Clark concurred in a separate opinion. The
other four Justices dissented.
Justice Jackson began by disposing of two preliminary ques_ U. S. (S. Ct. 1954).
=338 U. S. 25 (1949).
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tions, namely, that it was error to admit as evidence the record of
compliance with federal tax requirements, and that the payment
of the federal tax gave the petitioner a license to engage in this
form of gambling. He said there was no substance in this argument because the federal tax records were not confidential or
privileged but that the statute expressly made them public records
and the law also expressly stated that the payment of the tax did
not exempt one from any penalties imposed by local law. 3 He
then took up the more serious question of the conduct of the officers in entering the accused's house. He pointed out that this
was not a wire tapping case and hence there was no violation of
the Federal Communications Act. He stated that, "Few police
measures have come to our attention that more flagrantly, deliberately, and persistently violated the fundamental principle
declared by the Fourth Amendment as a restriction on the Federal
Government." "The decision in Wolf v. Colorado," he continued,
"for the first time established that security of one's privacy against
arbitrary intrusion by the police is embodied in the concept of
due process found in the Fourteenth Amendment", but for reasons
set forth in that opinion the Court had "declined to make the
subsidiary procedural and evidentiary doctrines developed by the
federal courts limitations on the states." Instead, the Court held
in that case "that in a prosecution in a state court for a state crime
the 14th Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence
obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure."
He admitted
that "the Court and individual Justices had wavered considerably"
as to the substantive rule governing federal searches in violations
of the 4th Amendment. He distinguished the instant case from
Rochin v. California5 where the Court had held that the use of
force by police to compel an accused to submit to a stomach pump
was a denial of due process. In the latter case he said the Court
avoided any mention of the Wolf case and obviously "thought that
illegal search and seizure alone did not call for reversal." He then
stated that although the opinion in the Wolf case was written in
the abstract and did not reveal the detailed facts, "actually the
search was offensive to the law in the same respect if not the same
' Irvine v. California, supra note 61.
' Irvine v. California, supra note 61.

42 U. S. 165 (1953).

SEARCH AM SE]ZtrEE

degree as here." The argument he said had been advanced that
even though it adhered to the Wolf ruling the Court ought to
reverse here "because the invasion of privacy is more shocking,
more offensive, than the one involved there." This, he refused to
do, saying: "We think ... that a distinction of the kind urged

would leave the rule so indefinite that no state court could know
what it should rule in order to keep its processes on solid constitutional grounds." '8, He thought that "the Wolf decision should
not be overruled for the reasons so persuasively stated therein,"
and that the rule there laid down was controlling here. He closed
by calling attention to the fact that if the police violated the rights
of Irvine under the 14th Amendment as defined in the Wolf case
the officers would be subject to prosecution under a federal civil
rights statute, and thought the Clerk of the Court should bring
this case to the attention of the Attorney-General.
Justice Clark wrote a short concurring opinion in which he
said that if he had been on the Court when the Wolf case was
decided he would have voted to apply the Weeks rule to the states;
but since the Court was unwilling to do so then or now he felt the
decision ought to be followed. He pointed out that of course the
Court could sterilize the rule announced in the Wolf case by
adopting a case-by-case approach to due process, but he felt that
made "for such uncertainty and unpredictability that it would be
impossible to foretell . . .just how brazen the invasion of the
intimate privacies of one's home must be in order to shock itself
into the protective arm of the Constitution."
Justice Black wrote a dissent, concurred in by Justice Douglas,
in which he took the position that since the information in the
hands of the Internal Revenue Collector was used against Irvine
he was convicted on "evidence extorted from him by the Federal
Government in violation of the Fifth Amendment." He quoted
from Ashcraft v. Tennessee67 that "the Constitution of the U. S.
stands as a bar against the conviction of any individual in an
American Court by means of a coerced confession."
Justice Frankfurter wrote a dissent, concurred in by Justice
Burton. He argued for what amounted to a case-by-case method
of determining the meaning of due process of law. He thought
Irvine v. California, supra note 61.

322 U. S. 143 at 155 (1941).
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the Wolf and Rochin cases represented the extremes of "the comprehending principle" of due process. The Wolf case rejected one
absolute and the Rochin case another. "The judicial enforcement
of the due process clause is the very antithesis of a Procrustean
rule," he stated. He continued by saying that the basis for the
decision here was laid down in the Rochin case in which the Court
had said, "Regard for the requirements of the due process clause
inescapably imposes upon this Court an exercise of judgment upon
the whole course of the proceedings (resulting in a conviction) in
order to ascertain whether they offend those canons of decency
and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous offenses." 68 He thought the mere absence of physical violence which
was present in the Rochin case ought not prevent the Court reaching a similar result for there was here "a more powerful and offensive control over the Irvines' lives than a single limited physical
trespass." "Surely," he thought, "the Court does not propose to
announce a new absolute, namely, that even the most reprehensible means for securing a conviction will not taint a verdict so long
as the body of the accused was not touched by state officials." He
concluded that "In applying the due process clause judicial judgment is involved in an empiric process in the sense that results
are not predetermined or mechanically ascertainable" . . . and

that that was "a very different thing from conceiving the results
as ad hoc decisions in the probrious sense of ad hoc." "Empiricism
implies judgment" he said, "upon variant situations by the wisdom of experience," while "ad hocness in adjudications means
treating a particular case by itself and not in relation to the meaning of a course of decisions and the guides they serve for the
future."
Justice Douglas wrote a separate dissent in which he protested
this decision as well as the rule of the Wolf case. The rule in the
latter case he thought was "part of the deterioration which civil
liberties have suffered in recent years." He thought the only
effective way to prevent illegal searches and seizures was for the
Court to apply the Weeks rule and exclude such evidence and
that "this is the time and the occasion to do it."
The result of the case is therefore that the Wolf rule is still
"342 U. S. at 169 quoting from Malinsid v. U. S., 324 U. S. 401 at 416, 417.
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adhered to as a matter of policy by four Justices including the new
Chief Justice; it was accepted by Justice Clark reluctantly because
a majority would not override it; and it was rejected as controlling
in this case by the other four members of the Court. There are a,
number of interesting things about the case. In the first place if
Justice Clark had refused to follow the Wolf rule, which he
thought was bad, and had dissented here, there would have been
a majority for excluding the evidence. This of course would not
have changed the Wolf rule for Justice Frankfurter presumably
would still follow it; but it would at least have prevented this
additional application of it. It may well be, however, as Justice
Clark suggested, that adhering to the rule may be the quickest way
to bring about its reversal.
Another interesting aspect of the case is that Justice Frankfurter who wrote the opinion in the Wolf case, here differed so
fully with Justice Jackson as to the use to be made of the rule. It
is submitted that when two firm believers in the rule differ so
much as to its use that fact helps to demonstrate the unsoundness
of the rule. Justice Frankfurter's case-by-case rule of determining
the meaning of due process, the complicated facts of many cases,
and the slight variation in facts of cases to say nothing of the
changing personnel of the Court, make this procedure rather
feeble guidance to police officers and lower courts. If the doubt
that Justice Jackson indicated he had that the Weeks rule had
been effective is well founded it may well be due more to the
uncertainty as to how the Court would apply it than to any
unsoundness in the rule itself. And his suggestion that state
officers could be prosecuted under federal statute for an infringement of a citizen's rights by the police, as Justice Douglas
pointed out, holds out little hope. Even if the Department of
Justice had the time, staff and interest to watch state police and
prosecute them for such offenses, the practical problem of the
police, as well as the Department of Justice, knowing just when
the due process of law clause was being violated would no doubt
be an insurmountable difficulty to any effective protection of the
individual's rights by this method. It is submitted that the sooner
the Court goes back to a vigorous application of the Weeks rule
and overrules the Wolf case the better it will be for civil liberties
and the easier it will be for courts and police. A case-by-case ap-
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proach to the meaning of due process has its advantages and in a
sense is the only approach to be used; but the decisions could and
should, it seems, be based on some guiding and consistent principle so that police officers and lower courts will have some more
ascertainable standard to follow. For example, if due process
protects those rights regarded as fundamental in a system of
"ordered liberty" and if freedom from unreasonable search and
seizure is one of those rights, then it would seem that the securing
of evidence by such methods should consistently be excluded,
rather than for the exclusion or admission to be based on such
matters as whether force or other methods so bad as to shock a
majority of the Court have been used. Nor would it seem to matter whether an office or house is actually invaded and searched
physically or whether the privacy of the individual is violated by
tapping his telephone wires or installing a microphone in his office
or house. As Justice Bradley said in the Boyd case, it is the violation of the indefeasible right of privacy that is important, not how
the violation was made.
Conclusion
The decisions of the Supreme Court examined in the four installments of this study have dealt with one of the most important
and difficult problems facing democratic governments everywhere,
that is, the reconciling of the right of the individual to have his
privacy respected and the need of enforcement officers to use
methods in catching criminals that encroach upon this right.
This problem was not so difficult in 1800 and did not become difficult so long as the country was living under the
relatively simple conditions of an agricultural economy. It is significant that the Boyd case, the first case in which the Supreme
Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment, was not decided until
1885. The period from 1875 to 1900 and even later has generally
been recognized as a period during which there was a lag in the
adjustment of our legal institutions to fit the needs of a technological and complex industrial society. In a sense, the Court has
had to adjust the Fourth Amendment, framed for a simple society,
to the needs of a complex one. It is almost inevitable that in doing
so the Court and the individual Justices would waver some in
their decisions, as Justice Jackson said in the Irvine case, they had.
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In retrospect the total effect of the Court's decisions seems to
be a contraction of the Fourth Amendment and a narrowing of
the protection it was intended to furnish to the individual; but
as to whether this has been done to a much greater degree than
other rights of the individual have fallen before the growing
functions of modern government, or to a greater degree than is
sound, there is room for different opinions.
There are two respects in which it seems that the Court has
been fundamentally in error in its interpretation of the Amendment. One of these respects is in connection with the use of
modern instruments to invade an individual's privacy without a
physical search. This error was committed originally in the Olinstead case which held that wire tapping was not a violation of the
Fourth Amendment since there was no entrance into the office
and a physical search. It was followed in later cases and applied
most recently in On Lee v. United States. The latter was an aggravated case because the federal agent was a "shady" character
and obtained the information by deception. The basic principle
of the Amendment that the individual's privacy should be respected will be largely defeated under this decision by the use of
modern means of picking up sound at a distance or by other scientific devices. Because a physical search was at the time the
Amendment was drafted, the only practicable way to invade the
privacy of the office or home does not mean that a physical search
should always be required for a violation of the Amendment.
That would seem to be confusing the principle and the process by
which the principle was violated. The commerce clause set forth
the principle that Congress could regulate interstate commerce
but the Court has not insisted that commerce had to be carried
on by the same process as in 1800 to enable Congress to regulate
it. As a matter of fact the use of the same mechanical devices for
amplifying sound and extending communications have been used
by the Court in upholding the power of Congress in respect of
telephones, telegraph, radio, etc. It was the principle involved
that was considered important and also as Chief Justice Marshall
once said, a recognition of the fact that it was a constitution to be
interpreted; a constitution designed to endure for ages and to be
adjusted to the changing crises of human affairs.
The second respect in which it seems the Court has erred is in
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widening the area of search incident to an arrest, which can and
does defeat to a considerable extent the purpose of the Amendment. The Court has repeatedly said in recent opinions that only
"unreasonable" searches and seizures are prohibited by the Amendment. If therefore a search without a warrant can be justified as
reasonable under all the circumstances-"the total atmosphere of the
case" as Justice Minton said in the Rabinowitz case-it is not a violation of the Amendment. So far this approach has been restricted
to a search incident to a lawful arrest, but there would seem to be
no inherent reason why it should be so restricted. For, if a search of
a man's office or apartment incidental to an arrest can be made
whenever the Court considers it "reasonable" to do so then why
not permit any "reasonable" search with or without a warrant? As
Justice Minton said the officers must account to the courts. Thus
the word "unreasonable" in the Amendment is used to restrict its
scope. This, it is believed, is contrary to the intentions and expectations of the men who framed it and of the leaders of the
period in which it was adopted. The real purpose was to prevent
the search of a home or office except under a warrant issued by a
magistrate.
The evidence that is available seems to indicate clearly that
the framers never thought of the likelihood of officers searching
a house as incident to arrest, and that they thought of unreasonable searches as those under general writs not isued according to
the procedure laid down in the amendment, that is, on oath or
affirmation, with a description of the place to be searched and the
things to be seized. The records of the state constitutional conventions between 1776 and 1780 which adopted bills of rights
containing provision similar to the Fourth Amendment are quite
instructive. Seven of these states adopted the equivalent of the
Fourth Amendment but those of three states served as models for
the others. The provisions of those three therefore will be presented. The Virginia bill of rights of 1776 came first and provided
that:
A general warrant whereby an officer

. . .

may be com-

manded to search suspected place without evidence of a
fact committed or to seize any person etc., are grievous and
oppressive and ought not to be granted .... 69
"For a full report on the origin of the Fourth Amendment, see Lasson's work

cited in note 1, First Installment (1953) 41 Ky. L. J. 196.
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Pennsylvania came next, September 28, 1776, and provided that:
The people have a right to hold themselves, their houses,
papers, and possessions free from search and seizures, and
therefore warrants without oaths or affirmation first made,
affording a sufficient foundation for them... are contrary
to that right, and ought not to be granted. (Emphasis
added)
Massachusetts had the most complete statement. It provided:
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable
searches and seizures of his person, his house, his papers,
and all his possessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary
to this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation, and if the order
in the warrant to a civil officer... be not accompanied with
a special designation of the person or objects of search,
arrest, or seizure; and no warrant ought to be issued, but in
cases, and with the formalities prescribed by the laws.
This provision was interpreted by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Dana, previously referred to, as making all searches and seizures without a warrant unreasonable.
When the federal bill of rights came before Congress, Madison
who presented it proposed that what became the Fourth Amendment read as follows:
The right of the people to be secured in their persons, their
houses, their papers, and their other property, from all
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
by warrants issued without probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, or not particularly describing the places
to be searched, or the persons or things to be seized.
Madison's proposals were referred to a committee of eleven which
recommended to Congress that it read as follows:
The right of the people to be secured in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, shall not be violated by warrants
issuing without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and not particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
During a discussion in which it was pointed out that "secured"
should be "secure," the Annals of Congress reported the following: "Mr. Benson objected to the words 'warrants issuing'. This
declaratory provision was good as far as it went, but he thought it
was not sufficient; he therefore proposed to alter it so as to read
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'and no warrant shall issue.' "70 His motion was lost but he was
made chairman of a committee of three to arrange the Amendments. When this committee reported his language was used and
accepted. It will be observed therefore that as the proposed
Amendment came from the committee of eleven the term "unreasonable searches and seizures" was not used although Madison
had used them. As the committee of eleven worded the proposal
the restrictions to be placed on the issuing of warrants was assumed
to furnish the protection desired and would, it seems, indicate
that warrants issued without these safeguards constituted what
was deemed "unreasonable." Mr. Benson apparently felt that by
using the term "unreasonable searches and seizures" followed by
the words "and no warrant shall issue" without the safeguards, the
Amendment was being made more inclusive. He felt presumably
that warrants issued with all the safeguards included might still
be unreasonable. In the light of the above evidence it would seem
that when the Court permits a search of an office or a house without a search warrant because it regards the search as reasonable
and on the theory that the Amendment prohibits only "unreasonable searches and seizures" it is using the term for the exact opposite of the purpose in adopting these words, that is, it is narrowing the scope of the Amendment rather than enlarging it. In
addition it is greatly expanding the limited right, incident to a lawful arrest, to search the person arrested and to seize the evidence of
or instruments of the crime that are in his open and immediate
possession and physical control, and being used at the time of
arrest.
The background of the Fourth Amendment indicates quite
clearly, therefore, that it was intended to require a search warrant
issued by a magistrate under numerous safeguards to make a
search or seizure "reasonable." The principle embodied in the
amendment was considered so important that our forefathers
thought it should be put in writing so as to eliminate the possibility of unregulated searches being permitted because considered "reasonable". All powers of government could be left to
the discretion of officials but this particular power was regarded
as too important to be so left. Governments do not usually consider their actions unreasonable.
' Quoted at page 101 of Lasson.

